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The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller was
clearly one of the most eagerly anticipated decisions of the Court's 2007
Term. 1 The first formal pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution's Second Amendment in generations,2 the
Court's ultimate declaration in the case-loosely put, that the Second
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms in self-defense is a right that
individuals as individuals enjoy3-was, by virtually all lights, a foregone
conclusion. When it arrived, many were outraged, but few were surprised.
Nor were many observers caught slackjawed by the Court's chosen method
for reaching its conclusion. Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia's
opinion in Heller was thoroughly originalist in form.
Predictably, Heller has breathed a new urgency into the long-standing
and long-simmering debates about originalism as an exclusive method of
constitutional interpretation,4 including the commonplace that it properly
displaces all its competitors by virtue of its unique, objective constraint on
the judicial construction of constitutional meaning. 5 How significant will
originalism be for the Roberts Court?
The essays in this Colloquium, written by some of the country's leading
academic thinkers about the Constitution's Second Amendment, engage the
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, and Faculty
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1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2 The last one came in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). I say formal, of
course, because many believed that other Supreme Court decisions, including, say, United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), were inexplicable but for a particular view of the
substance of the Second Amendment.
3 Various locutions and understandings of the right (or rights) at issue in Heller are
found in these pages. I only mean to gesture toward what Brannon Denning and Glenn
Reynolds maintain is a certain conclusiveness in Heller on the status of the Second
Amendment, understood as a collective, and not an individual, right. As they put it, "in
Heller[,] the Court unanimously interred the old 'collective' right interpretation of the
Second Amendment, which read the right to keep and bear arms as guaranteeing only a
state's right to maintain and arm a militia free from some federal control." Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 671, 673 (2008). Exactly how dead and gone it will stay, remains to be seen.
4 Or better yet, as Mark Tushnet reminds us, methods. Originalism comes in a variety of
forms. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OIo ST. L.J. 609, 609-610
(2008).
5 Mark Tushnet crisply lays out this argument in Tushnet, supra note 4, at 610, 616-
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originalism debates in various ways, propelling them forward. Mark
Tushnet's essay, tracing the genealogy of originalism into its latest forms,
suggests that Heller's "new originalism," which "seeks to determine what
constitutional provisions were understood to mean by ordinary, albeit
reasonably well-informed, readers of the terms at the time the terms were
embedded in the Constitution[,] '' 6 is so close to the "old originalism" it is
meant to displace that it "converges with the old [originalism] in its failure to
eliminate judicial choice and judgment."'7 That-judicial choice and
judgment-and not, as Heller itself professes, a single, determinate, and
unassailable legal truth the Court's method leads it to discover, is, Tushnet
maintains, what must explain Heller. Too bad the Court never gives us this
account of its own decision. By extension, the implication we are left to
reach is that Heller, as it stands, is a naked exercise of authority that awaits
the articulation of its real---or any constitutionally adequate-justification.
Hardly disagreeing, Saul Cornell's contribution pursues a more vigorous
line. Cornell's observations are not so much aimed at criticizing originalism
as constitutional method in the abstract (though he does let fly "that most
historians are militantly anti-originalist" 8) as they are focused on damning
Heller's rendition of history in the concrete. According to Cornell, one of the
most well-known and well-respected historians of the Second Amendment,
Heller gets its history very, very wrong.9 Indeed, Cornell seems at various
points to suggest, Heller gets its history so wrong, it teeters on, if it does not
clearly fall into, bad faith.' 0 All this leads Cornell to venture that the only
6 Tusbnet, supra note 4, at 609.
7 Id. at 617.
8 Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 Oiio ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008).
9 This is not, one assumes, only Cornell's view. As Richard Posner's own critique of
Heller proposes, "professional historians were on Stevens's side." Richard A. Posner, In
Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 35. Justice Stevens wrote
the dissent to Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court.
10 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 8, at 629 (describing one of Justice Scalia's
"assertion[s]" as "demonstrably false," and then offering that "[t]he notion that there was a
general consensus on the meaning of the Second Amendment that supports an individual
right with no connection to the militia is simply gun rights propaganda passing as
scholarship."); id. at 630 (deeming "Scalia's use of historical texts... entirely arbitrary and
result oriented[,]" and then continuing: "Atypical texts that support Scalia ... are
pronounced to be influential, while generally influential texts ... are dismissed as
unrepresentative. Such an approach is intellectually dishonest and suggests that Justice
Scalia's brand of plain-meaning originalism is little more than a smoke screen for his own
political agenda.") (footnote omitted); id. at 633-634 ("What makes Scalia's reliance on
Volokh particularly shocking is that Konig's Essay was cited in both the Petitioner's Brief
and the Brady Center's Brief. To ignore such powerful countervailing scholarly evidence on
such an important issue is intellectually dishonest.") (footnote omitted); id. at 635 (discussing
[Vol. 69:603
FOREWORD
plausible justification for the Heller decision (if there is one) rests in
contemporary notions of what the Second Amendment should be taken to
mean. 
11
Along the way to a similar point,12 David C. Williams's essay engages
the Heller Court's originalism to wonder why, and if, by its own lights, it can
properly recognize a right to keep and bear arms that is keyed to self-defense
without also recognizing a right to bear arms that is, more fundamentally,
grounded on a right to defend against governmental tyranny. 13 In doing so,
Williams prompts important reflections on the power of the Patriot's cry
about the value of liberty: literally worth dying for. If liberty is as valuable as
life itself, maybe even more valuable, but in any case, constitutive of life's
very meaning, why would the Second Amendment protect only a right to
arms in self-defense and not to safeguard liberty itself, especially against the
government? Contemporaneously, of course, there is a world of difference
between a right of armed self-defense and a right to stand guard, armed,
against what may appear to be an overweening government.t 4 Williams
knows and appreciates this difference and knows and appreciates that the
"other signs that Justice Scalia's methodology is result oriented and not an intellectually
rigorous application of a neutral, interpretive methodology."); id. at 636 ("While reading a
text backwards may make sense in the Bizarro world made famous in the pages of Superman
comic books and hilariously rendered in the post-modem sitcom Seinfeld, it is an odd
approach to constitutional interpretation for a judge seeking the original understanding of a
constitutional provision. Once again Scalia's originalist methodology turns history on its
head.") (footnote omitted); id. at 637 (describing Justice Scalia's reading of the preamble to
the Second Amendment as embracing a "Bizarro view."); id. at 639 (suggesting that "judges
[should] not play fast and loose with history."); id. at 639-640 & n. 63 (labeling Justice
Scalia's originalist method "originalist rhetoric," and his jurisprudence, "intellectually
dishonest.").
11 Cornell, supra note 8, at 639 ("Ironically, Scalia would have a more powerful
argument if he [had] ... simply argued that the Second Amendment gradually evolved into
an individual right over the course of American history.").
12 See David C. Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the
Uses of Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 658 (2008) ("Justice Scalia offers us an evolving
constitution based on a Living Tradition.").
13 Id. at 641 (observing that "it is not at all clear that the Second Amendment was meant
to protect a personal right of self-defense[,]" but it is "crystal clear that the Amendment was
meant to protect the right to keep and bear arms to resist tyranny-as the Heller Court itself
concedes."). See also id. at 660 (proposing that, "under Scalia's analysis, the people must
have a Second Amendment right to form private armies ... [b]ut as we have seen, Justice
Scalia ultimately repudiates any such idea as dangerously unsound. And so it is, but to an
originalist, the danger should be irrelevant. We should merely discern the meaning of the
constitution and damn the consequences. Otherwise, we are merely enacting our own
values.").
14 Reports of massive spikes in gun sales in the weeks after Barack Obama's election as
President are suggestive of some of the reasons why. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Buying Guns,
for Fear of Losing the Right to Bear Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A20.
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Justices do, too. 15 Just so, he forces us to recognize that, no matter how
impressed we are by the distinction, or how much we may collectively agree
it should matter legally, it is unavailable within the Heller Court's chosen
constitutional frame. Consistently applied, Heller's originalism, particularly
given the actual history of the Second Amendment that Heller recounts and
affirms, cannot distinguish between the two kinds of rights. 16 What are we to
make of such a decision? What are its potential dangers?
For their part, Brannon Denning and Glenn Reynolds pursue a different
tack on the question of method. Recognizing the power of the challenges to
Heller's originalism, they seek to fill in the opinion's gaps, and thus rescue
it, insisting that Heller, for all its claimed originalist credentials, has
"essentially followed the prevailing national consensus on the meaning of the
Second Amendment. ' 17 (This is just the sort of account of, and for, Heller
that Cornell and Williams point out must be found. 18) If Denning and
Reynolds are right, 19 their argument cannot but give serious pause to those
who, while generally believing that the meaning of the Constitution is an
"evolving" one, nonetheless oppose the view that the Second Amendment
protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms-even in self-defense.
Whatever else such an understanding 'of the Second Amendment is, it is an
end to any prospect that the State will have, as many liberals believe it
should, "a monopoly on the use of violence. '20
As important as debates about originalism and constitutional method,
more generally, are within these pages, the contributions to this Colloquium
go well beyond them, paving the way for future scholarship on the meaning
and impact of Heller. Tushnet argues that these debates-forms of
displacement-are better seen as transparencies for other debates about
politics and society, to which we should properly turn when thinking about
15 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 12, at 658, 667-669 (making the point).
16 Id. at 651 ("Scalia brought the individual right of resistance into the constitutional
domain for a very particular reason: that right brought with it a friend, the right of self-
defense, and Scalia could then exile the first right while allowing the friend to remain behind,
becoming the heart and soul of Heller's version of the Second Amendment."). See also id. at
660, 664 (discussing what a principled application of Justice Scalia's originalism should
entail).
17 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 671.
18 Cornell, supra note 8, at 639; Williams, supra note 12, at 658, 667.
19 Richard Posner agrees that "[a] majority of Americans support gun rights[,]" but he
does note that the "differences in attitudes toward private ownerships of pistols across
regions of the country and, outside the South, between urban and rural areas, are profound."
Posner, supra note 9, at 34.
20 Williams, supra note 12, at 669.
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what Heller means and does. 21 To similar effect in redirecting our focus on
the case is the idea that Williams powerfully provokes: that we should see
and understand, if only better to resist, the ways in which the Supreme
Court's Heller decision tends to lend a certain constitutional legitimacy to the
claims of radical citizen militias, which position their own anti-government
ideologies and practices as in the spirit of the Patriots who founded the
Nation, turning themselves into the latest, great defenders of American
Liberty. Even if Heller itself steadfastly refuses to recognize a right to defend
ourselves against governmental tyranny, and (as Williams repeatedly
affirms22) it does, it dangerously gives a certain hope to social movements
that imperil and take aim at the existing social order and the well-being of
other socially-subordinated groups.23 Denning and Reynolds are likewise
interested in the consequences of Heller, though the consequences that they
highlight are more conventionally, if no less significantly, legal. They want
to know and thus speculate on how Heller will (or will not) be incorporated
to limit the authority of state legislatures,24 and also how Heller,
incorporation questions aside, is likely to be treated by the lower courts.25
What will it come, legally, to be understood to mean? How, in this sense,
21 As he explains, after all, "I have gradually concluded that engaging in such
criticism-and criticizing the new originalism, too-is futile and, more importantly,
uninteresting. We can examine originalism's variations ... with an eye to using them to
diagnose something about politics and society. But, on the merits, defenses[] and criticisms
of originalism ... [a]t some point ... reach bedrock and [we] simply say: 'My spade is
turned."' Tushnet, supra note 4, at 623 (footnotes omitted).
22 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 12, at 650-651 ("Scalia ... has no intention of
actually recognizing a meaningful right of resistance under present circumstances."); id. at
658 ("Few today would celebrate a right of resistance, and Scalia clearly would not."); id. at
660 ("Scalia ultimately repudiates any such idea [that "the people must have a Second
Amendment right to form private armies"] as dangerously unsound."); id. at 667 ("Justice
Scalia ... clearly believes that the right of self-defense is valuable under present
circumstances, but the right of resistance is too dangerous."). But see, e.g., id. at 669 ("[T]he
Heller Court never admits that it has effectively terminated the right of resistance, and so we
can only sense its demise without having seen its funeral. The Heller Court never explains
why it has jettisoned the right of resistance, nor [has it] pondered the long-run consequences
for American democracy.").
23 Id. at 668 ("The Heller opinion is saturated with fear of the darkness that lurks in
men's souls.... [l]t fears the people en masse; it promises the right of resistance but then
ensures that it will be utterly ineffective.... [Plerhaps the Court is right to fear the people in
this way. If the people really had the tools to resist and believed that they had the right to
resist, we might quickly disintegrate into a complex civil war. As I have suggested
elsewhere, in this country, political violence has commonly been tinged with racism,
religious bigotry, and political intolerance. A right of resistance would not be good for less
powerful groups, especially racial minorities.").
24 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 679-688.
25 Id. at 688-693.
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will Heller come, loop-de-loop, to be a consequence of itself?. For his part,
Cornell invites us to see Heller as a reason to reflect not only on originalism
as constitutional method, including its ordinary trip-wires, but also how-no
matter the ways in which all legal texts are inevitably bound up with history,
and sometimes, as with Heller itself, make history, are history-they do not
possess the kind of power needed to render the histories they tell beyond any
shadow of doubt.
This Colloquium, among the first legal academic volumes dealing with
the Supreme Court's Heller decision to go to press, would not have been
possible without the work of many people and considerable institutional
support. There are, of course, first and foremost the contributors to it. They
all generously worked on an expedited publishing schedule to enable this
volume to be published as soon after Heller came down as it possibly could
be. There are also several others whose names must be mentioned. Chad
Eggspuehler, the Editor-in-Chief of the Ohio State Law Journal while Heller
was pending, sensed the history-making significance of the decision, and
committed room in the pages of the Journal he shepherded to a paper
Colloquium on it. Dylan Griffiths, Eggspuehler's successor as Editor-in-
Chief, took the commitment to an idea, and along with the support of the
Law Journal staff, especially Brad Stoll, its Executive Editor, brought it to
life. And last, but hardly least, Nancy Rogers, the Dean of the College of
Law when the idea for the Colloquium first came to light, supported it in
every way she could.
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